





INTERNATIONAL MIGRATIONS: ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES AND POLITICAL CHALLENGES

Giovanni Peri, UC Davis ESRI International Conference, Augst 1st 2024











Questions

- How did immigration affect the economies of advanced countries in last 30 years (US and Europe major receivers)?
- Did it cause Nationalist backlash? Always?
- Can/will immigrants offset/help with the demographic decline and aging of advanced economies? What policies can help in this direction?

Outline

- Some important facts.
- US and Europe.
- A simple Framework to think about economics effects.
 - Labor Markets
 - Innovation, productivity
 - Entrepreneurship
- Did it drive Political Backlash?
 - Depends on what type of immigration and local conditions.
- Will immigration replace declining population? Some feasible policy Ideas.

US is interesting reference: Long history, and conflicting sentiments Europe has only the last 40 years






Figure 1

ONE US SENTIMENT: WE ARE A NATION OF IMMIGRANTS







• The American Melting Pot





EUROPE...ONLY OCCASIONALLY



France football national team



Spain during Syrian crisis





ANOTHER US SENTIMENT: IMMIGRANTS ARE THE ROOT OF **OUR PROBLEMS**



1891: ""If Immigration was properly Restricted you would no longer be troubled with Anarchy, would no longer be troubled with socialism, the Mafia and such kindred evils!"

The immigrant tide, 1900





New York, 2018



EUROPE HAS THIS ONE TOO








FACT 1: HAS INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION GROWN?


- Migrants (people residing/working in a different country from where they were born)
- As % of world population have grown a bit:
- 2.3% in 1980, about 3.5% in 2020.

• Migration from **Developing/Emerging to Advanced Economies** has been growing much more in the last 30 years: 4% in 1990, about 10% in 2020, as share of receiving countries population.

1960-2020:

Immigrants from Developing Countries to Europe-US tripled as % of Population





GLOBAL FACT 2: WHERE DO IMMIGRANTS TO ADVANCED ECONOMIES COME FROM?

- Largest migration not from poorest countries, but from countries with intermediate income levels, into countries with high income levels.
- There the relation between migration rate and log income per person is an inverted U
- Why? Simple model of incentives (desire to move) and liquidity/information constraint (able to move) generates this pattern.

The Hump shape of Emigration rate and Development level




Figure 4

GLOBAL FACT 3: SELECTION OF MIGRANTS FROM DEVELOPING ECONOMIES

- Strong positive selection in education and skills, of migrants from all countries of origin.
- High skilled have highest benefits (in pure income) and possibly lower costs (better information, higher chances).
- Also positively selected in other important characteristics: risk-taking, adaptability, curiosity, health.

Strong selection of emigrants among highly educated, non-OECD countries





Figure 5


Fact 4: developed countries vary in their ability to attract High Skilled immigrants

- US (Canada, Australia) stronger attractors of high skilled than Europe.
- Us has strongest pull, at the highest level of STEM.
 - Higher education institutions
 - Highly dynamic companies attracts a disproportionate amount of top skilled.
- This generates great innovative-productive potentials of immigrants in the US.

US receive many more high-skilled immigrants than Europe, same unskilled.




Non college educated immigrants



College-Educated Immigrants

Percent of foreign-born in USA, 2018-19, ranked by skill



In summary:

- Increasing flow of people from emerging/middle income to rich economies;
- Highly educated for their origin, but differently selected across destination; Due to several factors.
- Europe and US at the receiving end of large numbers.
- The US has been in a special position in attracting high skilled, but several EU countries (UK, Switzerland, Norway, Luxembourg) did too.

How to think about their economic effect

- Macro framework, to organize in what productive roles (through what channels) immigrants affect the receiving economy **at the country level.**
- For these effects to occur immigrants need to be **integrated in productive role**s (labor, self-employment). We will analyze the probability of employment over time of immigrants.
- Then support with micro-focused empirical analysis, looking at specific mechanisms and impact on labor markets, regions, firms.

Accounting Framework (Peri 2012, IMF 2020)

Aggregate Production $Y_t = K_t^{\alpha} (A_t N_t)^{1-\alpha}$

$$Y_t = K_t^{\alpha} (A_t N_t)^{1-\alpha}$$

As capital responds to equal MP to real rate we can re-write: $Y_t = \left(\frac{K_t}{V_t}\right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}} A_t N_t$

Growth of output can be decomposed in:

$$\Delta \ln(Y_t) = \underbrace{\frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} \Delta \ln\left(\frac{K_t}{Y_t}\right)}_{Capital\ intensity\ change} + \underbrace{\frac{\Delta \ln A_t}{TFP\ change}}_{TFP\ change} + \underbrace{\frac{\Delta \ln N_t}{Labor\ Composite\ Change}}_{Labor\ Composite\ Change}$$

Each term can be affected by immigration, $\frac{\Delta N_{c,t}^F}{N_{c,t}}$

Aggregate effects

- The effects on Labor Aggregate, N_t , considering immigrants as labor supply. It depend on substitutability immigrant-natives in a (nested) CES aggregate.
- The effects on Capital intensity, $\frac{K_t}{Y_t}$, depend on the role of immigrants as creators of new firms, and in stimulating investments.
- The effect on TFP, A_t depends on STEM workers, innovators and scientific and technological change (productivity).

On each term we can estimate a causal effect

• Aggregate approaches estimate directly the effect of immigration on Capital intensity and on TFP, using a regression like:

$$\Delta ln(x_{c,t}) = Controls + \beta \left(\frac{\Delta N_{c,t}^F}{N_{c,t}}\right) + \varepsilon_t$$

• OLS is biased→ 2SLS, where IV are usually "shift-share instrument" using past settlements and changing origin groups flows; or push-drive immigration episodes (refugees, climate crisis) representing quasi-experiments.

Effects of increase in foreign-born by 1 percent of receiving country population

	Peri (2012), US states	IMF (2020), OECD countries
% Growth in Capital	0.27	0.84**
intensity	(0.23)	(0.23)
% Growth in TFP	0.97***	0.56**
	(0.36)	(0.23)
Notes:	1960-2000, 50 US states plus DC, 10-year response; 2SLS and shift-share IV	1980-2018, OECD countries, 5- year response; Local projection method identifying sudden migration episodes
Source	Table 2, column 3, Peri (2012)	Figure 4.17, IMF (2020)

In the long run these are effects on average wages:

+ 2% over 2000-2020 from TFP, +0.5% from capital intensity in US.

Additional Labor-Market effects

- In a national approach, and we model the competitioncomplementarity across skills in the composite labor term N_t.
- Key parameters is elasticity of complementarity between natives and immigrants.


$$ln\left(\frac{w_{st}^{D}}{w_{st}^{F}}\right) = Productivity + \frac{1}{\sigma} n\left(\frac{N_{st}^{F}}{N_{st}^{D}}\right) + \varepsilon_{st}$$

Refined by distribution across skills (college –non college)

Estimates of elasticity of complementarity 1/σ


- Around 0.05 to 0.10. Statistically significant.
- (Ottaviano Peri 2012, Caiumi and Peri 2023)
- Imply +0.5% extra positive effect on wages of natives in US, 2000-2020.
- Accounting for college non-college and their elasticity
 +2% positive for non-college.

 Figure 1: Evolution of immigrant population by education group (1960-2022)



Did immigrants fully integrate in labor markets?

Figure 5
Employment rate of Immigrants, relative to US-born, by cohort, 1965-2000




All cohorts of immigrants, since 1965 have overtaken natives in employment probability.

In Europe on average **full convergence after 10 years** (Lee, Peri and Viarengo 2023)

Micro- Evidence on STEM Immigrants and Productivity/innovation


- In US→ looking at H1B visas→ more innovation → higher local productivity growth. Higher wages for college natives (firm, regions, universities).
- In Europe evidence from countries such as UK, Switzerland: Opening labor markets to EU skilled immigrants \rightarrow more R&D, more innovation, more firm creation.



Evidence on Immigrants and firm-creation/start-ups

• In most OECD countries, and very strongly in US, immigrants have higher entrepreneurial rate than natives. Firm creation=job demand.

• Rate of start-up creation among US-born and Foreign-born master graduates in the US, 2000-2019:



Overall:

- Immigrants contributed and integrated to US and European Economies.
- They complemented local workers, stimulating labor markets for natives.
- They contributed innovation, entrepreneurship and productivity growth.
- Why do people dislike immigrants so much?

Political consequences

- Recent growth of immigration → recent growth of populism/nationalism/mainly among right wing parties.
- Is there a causal relation? Actual evidence, key are skills:
- college educated immigrants → reduce populism-nationalism;
- non college educated immigrants → increase populismnationalism
- Both in Europe/US. Think of Brexit vote in London;
- Think of local governments in NY/California (where most immigrants are) vs Alabama/Louisiana (where very few are). But also Texas/Arizona, where more non college immigrants are.














Opposite effect of college and non college immigrants

On republican Vote, US



On Nationalism intensity of vote, Europe, US

	(1) IV	(2) IV	(3) IV	(4)	(5) IV	(6) IV
				IV		
Time	2007–2016	2007-2016	2007–2016	2007-2016	2007–2016	2007–2016
Dep var:	Nationalism					Radical Right
All migrants						
Share	0.01					
	(0.05)					
Share HS		-0.14*		-0.17**	-0.22***	-0.03***
Situate II S		(0.07)		(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.01)
5714110						
Share LS		(0.07)	0.05	0.08**	0.15***	0.01***

Implications: "antidote" of nationalism/populism is more skilled immigration.

Balanced immigration does not increase nationalism/populism

The positive effects of skilled immigrants (economic, fiscal) offset the potential hostility.


Some more detail

- Qualifications:
 - Rural, less educated natives responded more towards nationalism.
 - Location suffering from manufacturing decline responded more.
 - High skilled immigrants increased young pro-global attitudes.
 - Nationalist-reducing effect from college educated non-white immigrants as well.
- Additional Evidence: Anti-immigrant sentiment associated to large mis-perceptions. Correcting misperception can be promising.

While there are additional benefits of immigrants in an aging society...

- Prevent labor force shrinking, reduce shortages and mismatches.
- Reduce dependency ratio, make pensions system more sustainable.
- Support the 'silver' economy (health care, personal care, food, hospitality typically employ larger share of immigrants).
- Keep innovation, entrepreneurship and creativity alive. Younger generations. Diversity of approaches.

...there is no sign yet that aging/population decline associates with more immigration



No correlation over last 20 years between measures of aging/population decline and net immigration. Similarly in US commuting zones.

Can we use policies to promote immigration in a sustainable way?

- Plan for balanced (college-non college) and sustained immigration
- Most college educated should be admitted through collegeeducation. Right selection. Time to integrate.
- Most non-college should be admitted for **jobs related to the silver economy.** Solve shortages. Connect them to natives.

Conclusions

- It is hard to talk economic of immigration without generating strong "political sentiment".
- Large economic benefits from high and benefits from low skilled immigrants, especially in an aging society.
- High skilled immigration may attenuate the backlash.
- And we need better communication and information on immigration facts and immigration policies.