Reversing the declining fertility trend of Japan

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Is low fertility problematic?

Solow growth model: Lower population growth (n) results in higher per capita GDP (y)

Accumulated capital is shared by a smaller number of people and entails higher per capita capital stock and output.

Is the problem so simple?

- Extension of Solow growth model
 - Lower fertility is problematic
 - Endogenizing the technological progress rate, scale effect Large population, large number of scientists and engineers, high technology level (or growth)
 - Population aging indeed slows down economic growth (Maestas, Mullen, Powell, 2023)
 - Lower fertility is less problematic
 - Acemoglu and Restrepo (2020) provide counter argument claiming that population aging induces automation
- Distributional problems between young and old
 - Decrease in pension benefits under the unfunded pension system
 - High capital-labor ratio results in a lower return to capital
- Low fertility is arguably problematic


Put more public funds into family policy?

- The pathway that the child subsidy increases fertility
 - Subsidy eases the trade-off between employment and fertility
 - Expand the availability of childcare services
- Subsidizing childcare costs
 - Does the price of childcare service increase?
 - If no, no supply response
 - If yes, how elastic is the supply?
 - If supply is inelastic, the benefit falls on the service providers
- Supply elasticity of childcare workers?
 - Do the increase in service price increase wages and employment of worker?
 - Answer is no in the case of elderly care workers (Kondo, 2019)
- Narrow path for the expansion of public funds to increase fertility
 - Expanding public funds may generate rent-seeking opportunities in the industry

Changing the division of housework between women and men

- Education can change the gender norm
 - Coeducation in household economics in junior high school induced men's involvement in household production (Hara and Rodrigues-Planas, 2021)

Figure 1: Men's Weekend Home Production Time



Hara and Rodrigues-Planas (2021)


Source: 2016 JTUS.

Notes: The analysis sample consists of married individuals born between April 1974 and June 1980 excluding April 1977; that is 12 quarters before and after the threshold. The X-axis shows the running variable (normalized quarter-year of birth). The vertical line is at the threshold, which is normalized to zero. The Y-axis shows the residuals from residualizing out monthly seasonality from each outcome variable. Birth-month fixed effect, day of the week, and prefecture are controlled for to calculate the residuals. The dots in the figure are the within-bin sample means, and the vertical bars on them show the 95% confidence intervals.

Changing the division of housework between women and men

- Curving long working hours is underway
 - The government impose the maximum overtime at 45 hours per month
 - Strict regulation on work hours implemented in 2019 indeed reduced the fraction of workers who work 50+ hours per week (Ogawa, 2023)
 - Regulating hours worked is the heart of the Labor Standard Act, and the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare can enforce the regulation through Labor Standard Inspection Office

Fraction of workers works 51+ hours per week



A strict upper limit applies to

Large firm: 2019

SME: 2020

Source: JPSED by Recruit

works

Note: Calculation by Kazuha

Ogawa

Narrowing gender pay gap

- 44 % of the raw gender wage gap (27%) can be explained by the gender wage gap within an establishment
- The government requires firms with 301+ employees to publicize the gender wage gap within an establishment starting by June 2023
- Studies on similar policies in Demark and the UK demonstrated the effectiveness, but not in Austria
 - Hara (2023) The Gender Wage Transparency Policy: Discussion on disclosure of wage differentials between men and women based on the Act on Promotion of Women's Participation and Advancement in the Workplace (Japanese)
 - https://www.rieti.go.jp/jp/publications/pdp/23p009.pdf

Concluding remarks

- We need a big picture
 - We need to enhance our understanding of why combating low fertility is important
 - Clarifying the mechanism through which more public funds for family policies increases the fertility
- We need a small picture as well
 - Discussion on the details of policy design in Japanese context
 - Learning from foreign experiences and cutting-edge research
 - Disseminating details of our experiences to contribute to enriching a global public goods